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TRUTH IN LENDING "SIMPLIFIED":
SIMPLIFIED?
RALPH J. ROHNER*
Disclosure of credit terms has been viewcd as a primary means of protecting con-
sumers from fraud and deception in credit transactions. To enhance the value of
disclosure, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of
1980. Professor Rohner analyzes this attempt to simplifij crcdit cost disclosures and
finds that the new Act is no more likely to increase consumer protection than the
original Truth in Lending Act. The new Act does solve some problems, but does
nothing about others and even introduccs further complexities into credit transac-
tions. Among the difficulties left unaddressed by the new Act are soni that are
unique to newly developing credit transactions.
INTRODUCTION
It is a truism to say that consumers benefit by having complete
and accurate information about the credit transactions they enter.
This truism, plus largely anecdotal evidence of deceptive credit pric-
ing practices, produced the federal Truth in Lending Act' (TIL) in
1968.2 In 1980, this Act was overhauled by the optimistically titled
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act (Simplification
Act) .3 After twelve years' experience with these mandatory disclosure
rules, one might expect reform to include a careful and scientific
reassessment of the goals of credit disclosure legislation and an equally
careful and precise reformulation of the rules themselves.
Alas, neither is true. The legislative process surrounding the TIL
amendments included no systematic attempt to identify and agree on
the fundamental goals of the Act.4 Moreover, the amendments them-
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. A.B., 1960, J.D., 1963, Catholic
University of America. The author has served as a consultant to the Federal Reserve Board since
1976 and was involved in portions of the Board's work on Truth in Lending Simplification. None
of the views expressed here are attributable to the Board or its staff.
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
2 See H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., st Sess. 6-10, 13 (1967), reprinted in [196S] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1962, 1964-67, 1970-71.
3 Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-2-1, 94 Stat. 163 (1980)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4 Truth in Lending was originally enacted with a flush of enthusiasm for disclosure's ability
to facilitate credit shopping, see text accompanying notes 19-25 infra, but with little attention to
the types of disclosures, if any, capable of effecting this goal or to the problems involved in
elaborating the statute to further it. See Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977
U. Ill. L.F. 669, 671-74. Subsequent efforts to rationalize the Truth in Lending disclosure
scheme in light of the Act's limited transactional impact have questioned the feasibility of this
purpose, see, e.g., Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 711, 711-37 (1979); Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
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selves-though well-intentioned and often helpful-are likely to fall
considerably short of achieving significant reform. Some shortcomings
reflect political compromises and other failures of execution;5 other
weaknesses are attributable to the inability of Congress and the inter-
est groups that influence its judgments to analyze the current dy-
namics and probable growth of the marketplace;6 still other problems
in the amended statute are due to inherent limitations on the capacity
of disclosure to cure marketplace ills. 7
Numerous ironies mark the Simplification Act. Congress has
"simplified" credit cost disclosures and the Federal Reserve Board has
issued a completely new Regulation Z8 to implement the amended
Act, yet consumer credit contracts are likely to be lengthier than ever
before.9 The Supreme Court finally has established the primacy of
Federal Reserve Board staff interpretations, 0 but the Board's staff has
chosen to stop writing individualized interpretations." The amended
Act's definition of open-end credit 12 reflects the consumerists' distaste
for "spurious" open-end credit plans that deny consumers important
total cost information, yet this definition may well permit many
Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 400, 405-35, and have proposed others, see, e.g., Landers &
Rohner, supra, at 737-52; Whitford, supra, at 435-70. Congress' simplification efforts, however,
have apparently perpetuated the original Act's (unrationalized) premises. Cf. note 50 Infra
(credit shopping still major purpose). Congress did hear testimony on information (disclosure)
theory during the hearings on the Simplification Act, but only from a single social scientist who
drew analogies from empirical data gathered on non-credit disclosure behavior. See text accom-
panying notes 47-50 infra; note 49 infra. Although helpful, see id., this testimony hardly
provided an adequate empirical basis for developing a workable disclosure agenda.
With the issuance of a new regulation to implement the amended Act, see note 8 Infra, the
Federal Reserve Board has finally articulated a discrete set of goals for Truth in Lending. See
Federal Reserve Board, Regulatory Analysis of Revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,941,
20,945-46 (1981), which lists 39 separate goals in nine functional categories. This articulation
comes after the fact, and, by the Board's own admission, the new regulatory scheme promises
only "net public benefits," not the measureable enhancement of each of the 39 goals. Id. at
20,948.
See text accompanying notes 74-132 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 133-66 infra.
See text accompanying notes 167-212 infra.
8 Revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)
[hereinafter New Regulation Z]. New Regulation Z was effective as of April 1, 1981, although
compliance is not mandatory until October 1982. See International Banking Facility Deposit
Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 97-110, § 301, 95 Stat. 1513 (1981). Until that date, creditors may
comply with the predecessor version, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (1981) [hereinafter Old
Regulation Z].
See text accompanying notes 105-26 infra.
10 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 565-70 (1980); text accompa-
nying notes 60-73 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 69-70 infra.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (Supp. IV 1980); see New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,893 (to be
codified in 12 C.F.R. § 2 26.2(a)(20)); text accompanying notes 156-60 infra.
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financial institutions to recast their credit offerings to use open-end
rather than closed-end disclosures. 13
Perhaps the most ironic turnabout is that now that we have
streamlined the mechanisms for credit cost disclosure to encourage
knowledgeable credit shopping, credit pricing practices may outrace
the consumer's ability to understand, compare, or control those mech-
anisms. Numerous state legislatures recently have raised or removed
interest ceilings;' 4 both state- and federally chartered institutions are
now "most favored lenders," free to use the highest rates available to
any creditors;' 5 Congress has preempted state rate ceilings for most
categories of residential mortgages' and is considering legislation to
preempt all usury laws for consumer credit;17 and lenders are increas-
ingly turning to adjustable-rate instruments for home mortgages and
other forms of credit.18
The Act itself generates some of these anomalies, although others
result from independent market forces and the Act's failure to respond
to them. Together they suggest the Simplification Act will provide no
more dramatic consumer protection than did the original statute.
Moreover, the reformed disclosure rules are almost certain to create-
13 See text accompanying notes 150-66 infra.
11 Some recent examples: Illinois, see Act of Sept. 25, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-660, 19S1 11.
Legis. Serv. 3053 (West) (rate ceiling removed for regulated lenders); New Jersey, see Act of
Aug. 3, 1981, cl. 103, 1981 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 239 (rate ceilings removed for small loans,
second mortgages, retail installment contracts, and home repair contracts); New York, see Act of
Nov. 26, 1980, ch. 883, 1980 N.Y. Laws 2162 (rate ceilings removed). See generally 35 Con-
sumer Fin. L. Bull. 131 (1981) for a list of laws pending in other states.
Is Under the National Bank Act, national banks have long been authorized to charge the
highest interest rate permitted to any lender in the state. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 19S0); see 12
C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1981); Marquette Natl Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
313-19 (1978) (national banks authorized to charge to out-of-state customers highest interest rate
permitted by state where bank located); United Mo. Bank v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774, 779,
781-82, 784-85 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (national banks have parity with most.favored state lenders;
interest rates may exceed those permitted to state banks).
Similar authority has now been extended to all federally insured banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d
(Supp. IV 1980), savings and loan associations, id. § 1730g, and credit unions, id. § 1785(gJ(1).
In the first major challenge brought under this new legislation, the court upheld most-favored-
lender status for federally insured state banks. Equitable Tr. Co. v. Sachs, No. A 60063! 120-Al
fol. 713, slip. op. at 35-37 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1981).
16 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (Supp. IV 1980).
17 H.R. 2501, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. H937 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981): S. 1406,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. S6627 (daily ed. June 22, 1981). Compare McFarland,
Federal Usury Preemption: Its Potential for Undermining State Regulation of Consumer Credit,
J. Retail Banking, June 1981, at 44, with Tidwell, Federal Usury Preemption: The Logical
Solution, J. Retail Banking, June 1981, at 52.
18 See, e.g., Hill, Buyers Adrift: How Floating Rates on Mortgages Affect More Home
Purchasers, Wall St. J., May 6, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Housing Yourself in the 807s: Can You Afford a
Mortgage?, 46 Consumer Rep. 400, 400-04 (1981) [hereinafter Housing Yourself]. This issue is
discussed in part IV infra.
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or at least accentuate-problems unique to credit transactions of the
1980's and 1990's. Space does not permit a comprehensive analysis of
the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act and the new
Regulation Z. This Article, however, may sharpen the reader's appre-
ciation of the Act's many anomalies.
I
BACKGROUND: TOWARD TRUTH IN
LENDING SIMPLIFICATION
The discussions surrounding the adoption of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act in 1968, and their sanguine assessments of what the Act would
or could do, make fascinating reading. There was widespread senti-
ment that requiring "clear and conspicuous" disclosure of finance
charges, annual percentage rates, and their credit terms would eradi-
cate many of the existing abuses in consumer credit transactions-
usury, flipping,19 unauthorized additional charges, and the like.20
More sophisticated commentators saw the Act as a useful complement
to the newly promulgated Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC):2 1 the federal law would standardize disclosure while a uni-
form state law would regulate the substantive terms, including rates,
of the credit contract. 22 The most persistent expectation, reflected in
" Flipping is a practice of compounding loans in such a way that the borrower ends up
paying interest on interest-without necessarily violating state usury laws. See generally J.
Spanogle & R. Rohner, Consumer Law 191-96 (1979).
20 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act: Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 40-45,
47-51, 60-63 (1967) (testimony and statement of Paul Douglas); The Truth About Credit Is
Coming, 33 Consumer Rep. 428, 428-30 (1968). But see id. at 430-31 (disclosure of more limited
utility in poverty areas).
21 See, e.g., McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. Law. 199
(1968); Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus. Law. 209 (1968). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UCCC in August 1968. See
Selected Commercial Statutes 890 (West 1981). Since then, 11 states have adopted some version
of the UCCC. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 5-1-101 to -9-103 (1973 & Supp. 1980); Idaho Code §§
28-31-101 to -39-108 (1980 & Supp. 1981); Ind. Code §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to -6-203 (1976 & Supp.
1980); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 537.1101-.7103 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 16a-l-
101 to -9-102 (1974 & Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A, §§ 1.101-7.127 (Supp.
1981-1982); Okla. Stat. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-101 (1971 & Supp. 1980); S.C. Code §§ 37-1-101
to -9-102 (1976 & Supp. 1980); Utah Code Ann. §§ 70B-1-101 to -11-105 (1980 & Supp. 1981);
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 421.101-427.105 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981-1982); Wyo. Stat. §§ 40-14-101 to
-702 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
22 Since the UCCC's disclosure requirements were similar to those under federal law, states
(the traditional regulators of consumer credit) enacting the UCCC could qualify for exemption
from TIL. See 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1976); Warren, supra note 21, at 212. Only five states-Con-
necticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Wyoming-were "exempted" from TIL disclo-
sure requirements. See [1981] 1 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 2256. The UCCC, moreover, was
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the Act's own declaration of purpose,2 3 was that disclosure would
enhance "economic stabilization" and "competition among the var-
ious financial institutions" through the "informed use of credit."2 4 In
particular, the Act was to "assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms" so that in individual transactions consumers could "compare
more readily the various credit terms available."
In the midst of this enthusiasm came two seminal law review
articles2 6 and the first formal casebook on consumer credit,27 all from
the pen of Professor Homer Kripke. Drawing on his extensive experi-
ence as counsel to credit grantors (while being completely forthright
about his procreditor bias28 ), Professor Kripke challenged the wide-
spread beliefs about the utility of Truth in Lending. In his view,
consumerist support for disclosure was a "put-on";29 proponents knew
that disclosure could have only a slight effect on the substantive abuses
about which they testified and agitated. Disclosure would prove virtu-
ally useless in poverty areas where consumers were a captive audience
for fraud and deception.30  Even in middle-class markets, Kripke
argued, disclosure would have only marginal value because these
more mobile shoppers already understood where credit was cheap-
est." He was not unsympathetic to reform in general: he supported
the UCCC, 32 sided with consumers on the abolition of "holder-in-due-
course,"' 33 and agreed that disclosure of consumer finance charges
subsequently amended to incorporate the requirements of the federal Truth in Lending Act and
Regulation Z. See UCCC § 3.201 (1974 version).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
-4 Id. § 1601(a).
2 Id. On the limits of TIL disclosure as a means to affect transactional behavior, see Landers
& Rohner, supra note 4, at 715-37; Whitford, supra note 4, at 405-35.
2 Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 (1969)
[hereinafter Kripke, Gesture and Reality]; Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 Column. L. Rev. 445 (1968) [hereinafter Kripke, Creditor Viewpoint].
* H. Kripke, Consumer Credit (1970).
28 Id. at xii; Kripke, Creditor Viewpoint, supra note 26, at 445 n.*, 487.
2 Kripke, Gesture and Reality, supra note 26, at 2-3 & n.6 (quoting Brackman, The Put On,
New Yorker, June 24, 1967, at 34).
3 Id. at 4-8.
3, Kripke, Creditor Viewpoint, supra note 26, at 460-67. Kripke also noted that disclosure
would not remedy those problems of fraud and deception that occur even in middle-class
contexts. Kripke, Gesture and Reality, supra note 26, at 9.
32 Kripke, Gesture and Reality, supra note 26, at 12. Kripke, however, acknowledged that
by itself the UCCC would not cure the ills of fraud and deception. See id. at 13 & n.53.
3 Kripke, Creditor Viewpoint, supra note 26, at 471-73. A "holder-in-due-course" (usually a
bank or finance company) assuming an installment obligation from a seller remains free from
any defenses that the buyer might have against the seller. With reference to consumer credit
contracts, Kripke felt that such an insulating doctrine amounted to a contract of adhesion. See
id. at 472-73.
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should be based on a simple annual percentage rate, rather than a
"dollars-per-hundred" formulation. 34  Despite strong industry senti-
ment that credit regulation is a matter for state law, Kripke criticized
Congress and the Federal Trade Commission for not dealing more
thoroughly with the myriad problems of consumer fraud. 3  Through-
out his writings, however, Kripke insisted on recognizing the trade-
offs and risks involved in regulating creditor practices, warning that
sweeping restrictions could miss their mark by unduly increasing the
cost or restricting the availability of credit, especially in poverty
areas. 36  His sobering assessment of the realities of the consumer
credit marketplace has contributed significantly to a balanced debate.
Professor Kripke's prescience on many issues was remarkable. 37
Truth in Lending has not eliminated consumer fraud and deception or
led to the adoption of a national policy on consumer protection in
credit transactions. 38  Moreover, Kripke's emphasis on creditor re-
sponse to TIL requirements highlights one major force behind the
1980 Simplification Act. Creditors were increasingly concerned with
1 Id. at 459-60.
35 Kripke, Gesture and Reality, supra note 26, at 41-44. Kripke pointedly remarked: "The
Senate bill .. never, throughout the years, contained more than truth-in-lending provisions,
although the hearings year after year demonstrated that the problem was largely one of fraud
and deception, not merely non-disclosure and misunderstanding of the rate of credit charge." Id.
at 9. Although initially the House went beyond mere disclosure, its provisions were "poorly
conceived," id. at 34 n.9, and essentially abandoned in the final Act, id. at 10.
36 See, e.g., id. at 6-7, 34-37; Kripke, Creditor Viewpoint, supra note 26, at 479.
37 As Kripke suggested, Congress has paid more attention to the problem of consumer fraud.
Since 1968, Congress has added legislation on credit reporting, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)), credit billing, Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), credit discrimination,
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), and debt collection, Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o
(Supp. IV 1980)). The Federal Trade Commission, through trade regulation rules, has virtually
eliminated any vestiges of holder-in-due-course protection for creditors. FTC Trade Regulation
Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1981). The FTC
still has pending a broad proposal to restrict other unfair creditor practices. Proposed FTC Trade
Regulation Rule Concerning Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975); see Braasch, Federal
Trade Commission Credit Practices Rule, 36 Bus. Law. 1252 (1981).
On the other hand, whether the UCCC ever became "the touchstone for consideration of all
state legislation in the field," Kripke, Gesture and Reality, supra note 26, at 2, is doubtful. Only
11 states adopted some version of the UCCC. See note 21 supra; cf. note 22 supra (only five states
exempted from TIL).
38 See generally Crandall, It is Time for a Comprehensive Federal Consumer Credit Code,
58 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1979); Leonard & TidweU, Consumer Credit Legislation: Is Federal Preemp-
tion Necessary?, 35 Bus. Law. 1291 (1980); Rohner, "For Lack of a National Policy on Con-
sumer Credit.. ."; Preliminary Thoughts on the Need for Unified Federal Agency Rulemaking,
35 Bus. Law. 135 (1979) [hereinafter Rohner, Unified Agency Rulemaking].
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the growing intricacy of the disclosure rules, as well as with case law
and agency interpretations that construed TIL inconsistently. The
broad potential liability for civil penalties compounded these con-
cerns.
39
The original Regulation Z supplemented the disclosure scheme
with a number of detailed requirements not specifically called for by
the statute.40  By 1980, the Federal Reserve had issued more than
sixty official Board Interpretations 4' and more than 1500 official and
unofficial staff letter interpretations of Regulation Z. 42  Accompany-
ing this explosion in the interpretation process was inconsistent judi-
cial resolution of numerous questions under the Act and Regula-
tion.43  At times, different federal enforcement agencies themselves
When the National Commission on Consumer Finance issued its report in 1972, National
Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United States (1972), its prescrip-
tion for broad-scale reform echoed many of Kripkes conclusions. The Commission's recommen-
dations included removing barriers to the operation of competitive forces among creditors,
combating monopoly and restrictive practices among creditors, curbing market excesses, and
creating consumer credit extension programs. See id. at 4.
See S. Rep. No. 73, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 6-8 (1979), reprinted in [19S0] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 280, 281, 284-86. See generally Simplify and Reform the Truth In Lending
Act: Hearings on S. 1312, S. 1501, and S. 1653 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter
Simplification Hearings].
40 Old Regulation Z required terminology not specified by TIL. For example, for credit sales
under Old Regulation Z the following phraseology was required: "annual percentage rate,-
"total of payments," "balloon payment," "cash price," -cash dowvnpayment,. "trade-in," "total
downpayment," "unpaid balance of cash price," "unpaid balance," "prepaid finance charge,-
"required deposit balance," "amount financed," "finance charge," and "deferred payment
price." Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, § 226.8. New Regulation Z drops most of these
requirements. See New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,896, 20,902-03 (to be codified in 12
C.F.R. §§ 226.8, 226.18). In addition, Old Regulation Z required disclosure of the aggregate
cost of a credit sale, Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, § 226.8(c)(8)(ii), and extensive identifica-
tions of open-end credit transactions, id. § 226.7(k), and had special rules for "prepaid finance
charges" and "required deposit balances," id. § 226.8(e), and for refinancings, assumptions, and
deferrals, id. § 226.80), (k), ().
41 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.101-.1503 (1981); see Brandel, An Overview and Introduction to the
Annual Survey of Consumer Law Developments, 34 Bus. Law. 1401, 1401 (1979).
4 See Federal Reserve Board, Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg.
50,288, 50,288 (1981) [hereinafter FRB Official Staff Commentary]. For a discusson, see text
accompanying notes 60-73 infra.
43 The Supreme Court has recently resolved several such inconsistencies, e.g., whether TIL
requires separate disclosure of acceleration and its consequences, Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555, 562, 570 (1980) (separate disclosure not required when creditor's interest rebate
policy was identical under acceleration and voluntary-prepayment options), and whether a
creditor's right to unearned or rebated insurance premiums must be disclosed as a security
interest, Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 101 S. Ct. 2266, 2275-76 (1981) (disclosure not
required). But numerous other issues remain subject to mixed court holdings. For a comprehen-
sive review of the cases, see Willenzik & Leymaster, Recent Trends in Truth-in-Lending Litiga-
tion, 35 Bus. Law. 1197 (1980); Willenzik & Schmelzer, Truth in Lending Activities During
1980, 36 Bus. Law. 1133, 1134-52 (1981).
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seemingly disagreed about what Regulation Z required. 44 Con-
sumers, meanwhile, were continually challenging particular omis-
sions or inclusions in creditor forms; thousands of lawsuits annually
were being reported in the federal courts alone, 45 with uncounted
additional suits in the state courts. Creditors faced the prospect of
class action recoveries with a minimum award of $100 per consumer
plus costs and attorneys' fees, despite protections added to TIL in 1974
and 1976.46
There was also a strong consumer-based rationale underlying the
reform of TIL. 47  There was a growing sense that the quantity and
complexity of required disclosures defeated their utility for credit
shopping purposes. 48 Testimony presented during hearings suggested
that consumers could digest only limited amounts of information
about a transaction, and that the extensive disclosures under Truth in
Lending could result in "information overload" for consumers. 40 That
44 See, e.g., USLIFE Credit Corp. v. FTC, 599 F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th Cir. 1979). Although
the Federal Reserve Board has exclusive authority to promulgate regulations Implementing TIL,
enforcement is parcelled out among numerous federal agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). The problem of multiple agency enforcement is discussed in Rohner, Unified
Agency Rulemaking, supra note 38, at 139-46.
45 See Brandel, supra note 41, at 1401 (as of mid-1978, more than 9000 TIL lawsuits had
been filed in federal district courts); Willenzik & Leymaster, supra note 43, at 1197 (over 14,000
TIL suits filed in federal courts, 1969-1979; figures based on published data compiled by the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts). Evidently, assertions of TIL violations were becoming a
standard weapon in the arsenal available to consumers for settlement or leverage In defaulted or
otherwise broken-down transactions. See Landers, supra note 4, at 676-80, 683-86.
41 Before 1974, prevailing plaintiffs could recover a minimum of $100 each. 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(1) (1970) (amended 1974 & 1976). For class action plaintiffs, there was no cap on
creditor liability beyond the size of the plaintiff class. In 1974, TIL was amended to limit a class
recovery to the lesser of $100,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth, and, in determining
class action awards, courts were instructed to consider, inter alia, the "frequency and persist-
ence" of violations and the extent to which they were "intentional." Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1517. In 1976, the dollar limit was raised to $500,000. Act of
Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4, 90 Stat. 257. The Simplification Act extends these
limitations to any "series of class actions arising out of the same failures to comply by the same
creditor." Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615(a)(1), 94
Stat. 132 (1981) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980)).
47 Simplification was also designed to adjust provisions that experience indicated were
ill-designed for the marketplace that existed a decade after the original Act. For example, TIL's
coverage of agricultural credit, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(h), 1603(s) (1976) (amended 1980), was of
dubious value, while the rules on real estate mortgage transactions did not recognize the
comparability of transactions involving mobile homes ("manufactured housing"). See S. Rep.
No. 73, supra note 39, at 10, (1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 287. Under the Simplifica-
tion Act, agricultural credit is redefined and exempted from the Act's requirements, 15 U.S.C.
44 1602(s), 1602(t), 1603() (Supp. IV 1980); dwelling is defined to include mobile homes and
cooperative units, id. § 1602(v).
48 See S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39, at 3-4, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 281.82.
41 See, e.g., Simplification Hearings, supra note 39, at 111-18 (testimony of Dr. Steven
Permut). Referring to that testimony, the Senate report said:
The subcommittee learned that judging from consumer tests in other areas, the typical
disclosure statement utilized today by creditors is not an effective communication device.
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is, overwhelmed by the sheer mass of information on the disclosure
statement, consumers would ignore it all. Thus, for disclosures to be
useful, disclosures would have to be few in number and more clearly
expressed; they would have to be simpler.50
These factors coalesced to produce the Truth in Lending Simpli-
fication and Reform Act.5' Like the original TIL, the revised Act has
generated, and promises to continue to generate, interesting anoma-
lies.
II
PROBLEMS OF FAULTY EXECUTION
The principal goal of the Simplification Act, again, is to reduce
both creditor problems in complying with disclosure requirements
Most disclosure statements are lengthy, written in legalistic fine print, and have essential
truth in lending disclosures scattered among various contractual terms. The result is a
piece of paper which appears to be "just another legal document" instead of the simple,
concise disclosure form Congress intended.
S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39, at 3, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 281-82. For
elaboration of the "information overload" theory, see Landers & Rohner, supra note 4, at
722-25. See generally Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdiscosure and Gobbledygook: An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 841 (197T).
'0 Unlike Professor Kripke, see text accompanying note 31 supra, Congress was not skeptical
of the utility of disclosure as a shopping tool and, indeed, made dear that facilitating shopping
was the major (consumer-based) purpose behind simplification. Thus, changes in the civil
penalty provisions were "intended to restrict the scope of creditor civil liability ... to only those
disclosures which are of material importance in credit shopping." S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39,
at 17, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 294. In addition, Congress believed that
eliminating disclosure of itemization of the amount financed would -not diminish the act's
usefulness as a shopping tool." Id. at 16, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 294. And
allowing the Federal Reserve Board to e.periment with distributing guides listing the annual
percentage rates charged by creditors in given areas for given types of loans would be "of great
benefit... as a shopping tool for consumers." Id. at 19, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. Nevs at
296.
51 See note 3 supra. Senator Cam (R.-Utah) first introduced a simplification bill in 1976. S.
3302, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Ree. 10,644 (1976). This bill died in committee, as did
numerous other simplification proposals introduced in 1976 and 1977. In 1978, the Senate passed
a simplification bill, S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. 13,154 (1978), but the House
failed to take action on it. Senator Proxmire reintroduced an identical bill as S. 108, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. S4984 (daily ed. May 1, 1979), which again passed the Senate but was
not acted upon by the House. The (slightly revised) simplification provisions of S. 103, however,
were included in H.R. 4986 which, after conference negotiation, passed both the House, H.R.
4986, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. H2273 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 19S0), and Senate, S. 10S,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong. Ree. S3235 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 19S0). The Truth in Lending
simplification provisions were thereby enacted as title VI of the omnibus Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (19SO)
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.). The development of the Simplification Act and
the Federal Reserves early work on a revised Regulation Z are reviewed in O'Connor, Truth in
Lending Simplification, 36 Bus. Law. 1161 (1981); O'Connor, Truth in Lending Simplification,
35 Bus. Law. 1221 (1980).
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and consumer problems in reading and understanding what has been
disclosed. To this end, the Act has reduced and streamlined the disclo-
sures required in closed-end transactions52 and made changes in the
format these disclosures must take.5 3  The Act and New Regulation Z
have also modified the definitions of creditor4 and open-end credit, 55
made changes in the timing of disclosure, 51 and limited somewhat the
civil liability of creditors for TIL violations.. 7  In general, it is fair to
say that these modifications 5 better accomplish the goal of facilitat-
ing creditor compliance than that of enhancing consumer understand-
ing, although some creditor-related problems remain.
A. Facilitating Creditor Compliance
1. Inconsistent Interpretations
As noted, creditors have been concerned with both inconsistent
and unexpected judicial interpretations of TIL. The question that
repeatedly surfaced was what weight courts should give to Federal
Reserve Board staff letters.-" Courts have in fact been willing to
depart from the interpretations provided in Board staff letters.00
When set alongside the considerable volume of staff letters, 01 this
52 Closed-end transactions are fixed-term, one-time transactions between the creditor and
borrower. See text accompanying notes 150-51 infra.
'3 See section II, B infra.
See text accompanying notes 74-103 infra.
See section III, B infra. The Act also makes other changes in regard to open-end credit; for
example, it provides for a right of rescission in transactions involving a security interest In the
consumer's principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The actual disclosures
required for open-end transactions have been left substantially unchanged.
" See section III, A infra.
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); notes 46, 50 supra.
58 Of course, there are other modifications. For instance, the Simplification Act alters TIL's
coverage by exempting agricultural credit but including mobile homes. See note 47 supra. It also
contains provisions affecting methods of calculation, for example, specifying tolerances In calcu-
lating and disclosing annual percentage rates. See 15 U.S.C. § 1606(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (.125%
tolerance). Due to limitations of space and scope, these and other changes cannot be discussed
here. For an overview of Simplification Act changes, see O'Connor, Truth in Lending Simplifi.
cation, 36 Bus. Law. 1161 (1981); Replansky & Kauffman, The Truth in Lending Simplification
and Reform Act of 1980: A New Deal for the Creditor, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 200 (1981).
59 The Supreme Court established in 1973 that TIL gives the Federal Reserve Board a broad
grant of authority to amplify the statute through formal Board regulations. See Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 365-78 (1973).
60 See, e.g., St. Cermain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572, 576, 577 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977)
(acceleration clause is "prepayment," not "charge," and must be disclosed); Jones v. Community
Loan & Inv. Corp., 544 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1976) (loan fee must be disclosed as prepaid
finance charge), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 934 (1977); Pollock v. General Fin. Corp., 535 F.2d 295,
298-99, 298 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (amount of loan must be separately itemized), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 891 (1977).
"I These letters number more than 1500. See FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42,
at 50,288,
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judicial behavior hindered creditors who in good faith wanted to
comply with the law.62
Although the revised Act addresses this problem only obliquely, 63
the Supreme Court has now established that Federal Reserve Board
staff letters are to be given controlling weight by courts considering
alleged TIL violations. In 1980, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhol-
lin,64 the Supreme Court held that courts should defer to Board staff
interpretations unless they are "demonstrably irrational."65 This re-
markable standard for the weight to be given administrative agency
staff letters was appropriate, said the Court, because of the complex
nature of Regulation Z, the need for certainty, and the resulting need
for a single, dominant interpretive voice. 66 More recently, in Ander-
son Brothers Ford v. Valencia,67 the Court again indicated that courts
must accept Board staff interpretations unless they reflect "some ob-
vious repugnance to the statute."6 8 The primacy of the Federal Re-
serve and its staff as interpreters of Regulation Z is now established
and lower courts are henceforth admonished to give heed.
But to what? The Board and its staff have concluded that the
dangers of an endless flow of staff letters-ad hoc and meticulously
hairsplitting, in combination creating a huge and nearly impenetrable
sub-body of TIL jurisprudence-outweigh any value such a flow of
letters might now have in avoiding inconsistent court holdings.' 9 In
'2 See S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39, at 2, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 281. In
fact, the consumer stake in this issue goes beyond concern for creditor compliance; creditors
cannot succesfully be sued or prosecuted under the Act if they acted "in good faith in conformity
with" a staff interpretation. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (Supp. IV 19S0). Indeed, creditors sought out
letters "blessing" novel features of their credit plans precisely because of their immunizing effect.
See Landers & Rohner, supra note 4, at 712 & n.3. To a significant degree, therefore, creditors
brought the problem of complexity upon themselves. See id.
6 The Act reduces the number of disclosures and specifies that only certain misdI lasures
will support a consumer's recovery of the minimum $100 penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980). Thus, by eliminating the inducement to sue for noncompliance, the Act may perforce
eliminate or reduce inconsistent or novel interpretations of those less important disclosures.
444 U.S. 555 (1980).
6 Id. at 565.
6 Id. at 566-68.
7 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
cs Id. at 2274. The basis for decision in Valencia is very curious. Relying principally on the
Board's proposed Official Staff Interpretation FC-0173, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,295 (19S0). the Court
concluded that a creditor's right to insurance proceeds or rebated premiums was not a discloable
security interest. 101 S. Ct. at 2270-74. The staff had never adopted that Interpretation, and in
fact had postponed further action in deference to the Court's decision to hear the case. See Id. at
2278 & n.6 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In issuing its Proposed Official Staff Commentary to accompany Regulation Z, the Board
staff reasoned:
Although originally designed to aid creditors in complying, the long-standing practice of
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lieu of interpretation letters, therefore, the Board and its staff will
now issue only official textual commentary on Regulation Z. 70  The
commentary has the status of an official staff interpretation; 71 it Will
contain extensive although generalized discussion of how the Regula-
tion is to be construed and applied in various circumstances. 72
The irony in the situation is evident. No matter how carefully
drafted and updated, this commentary cannot be as precise, thor-
ough, or current as individualized advisory letters to creditors. The
question, therefore, is whether the Board has cured the problem of
complexity only by substituting that of uncertainty. Two scenarios are
possible. Courts may create subrules and distinctions to fill interstices
in the Regulation-cum-commentary. This situation is likely to reintro-
duce the problem of inconsistent interpretations of the disclosures TIL
requires. Or courts may extrapolate from the Supreme Court's direc-
tions in Milhollin and Valencia and uphold creditor practices as long
as they do not obviously run afoul of New Regulation Z as elaborated
by the commentary. Such judicial restraint would enhance predict-
ability and certainty and is preferable as a means of facilitating credi-
tor compliance.73
2. Multiple Creditors: Extenders and Arrangers
One of the most persistent problems under the original Act and
Regulation was determining who was a "creditor" subject to disclo-
sure responsibilities. The definition of "creditor" included any person
who "regularly extends or arranges for the extension of consumer
trying to respond in writing to each and every special circumstance has instead created an
enormous amount of regulatory material. The cumulative effect of the interpretations has
been to complicate, rather than facilitate, compliance by layering one set of distinctions on
top of another. Rather than resolving questions, this material in the aggregate has served
to generate further questions.
46 Fed. Reg. 28,560, 28,560 (1981).
70 "No official staff interpretations are expected to be issued other than by means of this
commentary." FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,289.
71 Thus, good faith compliance with the commentary immunizes creditors from liability
under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (Supp. IV 1980). FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at
50,289.
72 See FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,288.
73 There is an independent reason why the Valencia and Milholltn decisions may tend to
stifle lower court mischievousness. Both opinions accept the philosophy of the Simplification Act
that "meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure," thus discouraging lower courts
from finding new or additional disclosure requirements beyond the black letter of the Regula-
tion. Valencia, 101 S. Ct. at 2276 n.21; Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 568. Until explicit guidance Issues
from the Supreme Court, however, it remains uncertain whether the lower courts will adopt this
"less disclosure is better" approach to TIL now that the Federal Reserve Board has decided to
issue only a staff commentary.
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credit." 74 This definition encompassed two categories of creditors:
"extenders" (those who actually advance the credit) and "arrangers"
(those who "provide or offer to provide consumer credit... extended
by another person"75).
Old Regulation Z compounded matters in several ways. In
closed-end transactions, the disclosure statement had to identify "the
creditor. '76  In addition, if there was more than one creditor in a
transaction, each had to be identified and each was responsible for
those disclosures "within his knowledge and the purview of his rela-
tionship with the customer. 77 Finally, a provision added to the Act
in 197478 stipulated that a "subsequent assignee" was not liable for
violations unless they were apparent on the face of the credit instru-
ment. It is clear, however, that, in fact, dealers and assignees rou-
tinely collaborate to generate consumer paper, and direct lenders
depend on referrals from dealers and brokers. Who, here, extends the
credit and who arranges it? Who must be identified, and who can be
sued for violations?
This situation led to considerable judicial freelancing in deciding
what responsibilities rested on whom. For example, one line of cases 79
held that in typical indirect automobile financing, the consumer fi-
nance company or bank that bought consumer paper from the dealer
was a creditor, not a "subsequent assignee," and thus was subject to
identification on the disclosure statement and to liability for any
violations.80 Another line of cases"' concluded that a dealer who
received a commission for referring customers to a direct lender was
an arranger, but the opinions diverged on just what disclosures had to
14 Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, § 226.2(s).
'I Id. § 226.2(h). To be an arranger, the person must either have received some consider-
ation for the service, or have helped prepare the documents with knowledge of their terms.
78 Id. § 226.8(a).
Id. § 226.6(d).
78 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 413(a), 88 Stat. 1517 (repealed 1980) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (Supp. IV 1980)).
71 The landmark case is Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 514-16 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977).
Subsequent cases differed on how e.'lieit the creditor's identification had to be, although
the Supreme Court has now resolved this issue. Compare Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615
F.2d 423, 425-26 (7th Cir. 1980) (identifying credit companies as "assignees" satisfies TIL and
Regulation Z), with Cenance v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 621 F.2d 130, 133-34 (5th Cir. 1950) (Regula-
tion Z requires specific identification of financer as "creditor"), affd in part and rev'd in part per
curiam sub noma. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 101 S. Ct. 2239, 2240-41 (1981) (financer
is creditor under Act; Regulation Z satisfied by identification as "assignee").
" The leading case is Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102, 104 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976).
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be made by the dealer and by the lender. 82 A third line of cases,
mostly involving health club membership agreements, concluded that
regular discounting of such agreements to financers was evidence that
a finance charge was being imposed, 8 3 bringing both the health club
and the financer creditors under the Regulation .4  Although not
often litigated, 85 the question whether real estate brokers who merely
assisted customers with mortgage financing were arranger-creditors
was the subject of many Federal Reserve staff letters. A
The revised Act and New Regulation Z simplify this area by
carefully redefining "creditor" so that in virtually all transactions
there will be only one creditor. Generally, to be a creditor one must
regularly extend consumer credit and be the one "to whom the obliga-
tion is initially payable ...on the face of the note. '87  In typical
indirect financing this will be the dealer; when there is no assignment
of consumer paper from dealer to financer it will be the direct
lender. 88
Although Congress' intent to restrict the definition in this fashion
is clear, " the language of the Act and Regulation is subject to quibble.
In what sense does an auto dealer "extend credit" when all he does is
prearrange for the immediate assignment of the consumer's obligation
to a financer? Even though the note or contract initially may be
payable to the dealer, theoretically- and as a matter of economics-
the party whose money is at risk is the financer. 0° This reading,
82 Compare Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295, 296-97 (10th Cir. 1976)
("arranger-seller" and lender each required to make disclosures that are within scope of Its
relationship with consumer), with Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102,
105-06 (3d Cir.) (when seller arranges credit, only seller is required to make disclosures), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976).
s3 See Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1976); Krlger v.
European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 334, 335-38 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
4 Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 91-93 (8th Cir. 1976).
8- But see Childress v. Mobile Living Corp., 386 F. Supp. 903, 904-05 (E.D. La. 1974),
aff'd, 525 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1975).
8' See, e.g., id. at 904-05 (citing letters); Federal Reserve Board Public Information Letter
No. 892, [1974-1977 Truth-in-Lending Special Releases] Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 31,218:
Federal Reserve Board Public Information Letter No. 344, [1969-1974 Truth-in.Lending Special
Releases] Con. Cred. Guide (CCH) 30,399.
11 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,893 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(1)).
8' The liability of the assignee-financer is now controlled by 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (Supp. IV
1980).
11 See S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39, at 10, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 287.
90 As the Supreme Court observed in describing the typical auto financing pattern that raised
the multiple creditor issue under the old Regulation:
The facts negate any suggestion that the dealers anticipated financing any of these transac.
tions. The sales were contingent upon [the financer's] approval of the credit worthiness of
the buyer. The acceptance of the contract and the assignment became operational simulta.
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however logical, leads to an absurdity: the dealer is not a creditor
because he does not extend credit, but neither is the financer a credi-
tor because he is not the designated payee of the note. To understand
the Regulation, one must accept the notion that the dealer actually
does extend credit, even if merely temporarily. This conclusion is
reinforced by recognizing that the dealer customarily will guarantee
the collectibility of the paper through repurchase or recourse arrange-
ments with the financer. Since the dealer is the only Regulation Z
creditor, the dealer alone needs to be identified; since the dealer is also
the seller, disclosures for a credit sale are required.91
Similarly, when a consumer approaches a direct lender for a loan
to buy property the lender alone will be a creditor, even if a dealer or
broker helped bring the parties together. The lender both extends the
credit and is payee on the obligation; the involvement of the dealer or
broker is immaterial to fixing disclosure responsibilities under the new
Regulation.9 2  (The lender of course is free to seek some indemnifica-
tion arrangement with the dealer for violations attributable to the
dealer's handling of paperwork or the like.)
But the dealer or broker in this setting appears to be an arranger
of credit and therefore covered by the Regulation, since the new
definition does include "arranger" as a subcategory of creditor 3 sepa-
rate from the general extender-payee rule just discussed. In fact,
though, the "arranger" plays a very limited role in New Regulation Z.
A person is an arranger only if the actual extender of credit is not a
professional lender or financer.9 4  That is, an arranger is one who
regularly brokers credit arrangements between consumers and persons
who are not themselves creditors.
Apparently, it was expected that application of the arranger-
creditor definition would rarely occur, and then solely when a profes-
sional intermediary arranged for the placement of loans with private,
nonprofessional investors 9 5 In that case, it was thought, the ar-
neously and the assignment divested the dealer of any risk in the transaction.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 101 S. Ct. 2239, 2241 (1981) (per curiam).
91 Credit sale disclosures are necessary when the seller is a creditor. New Regulation Z, supra
note 8, at 20,893 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 22.6.2(a)(16)). The required credit sale disclosures
are set out in id. at 20,902-03 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18j)).
92 The lender must make loan disclosures. Although the loan finances a sale, credit sale
disclosures are required only when the seller is the creditor. See note 91 supra.
93 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,893 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(ii)).
' See id. at 20,893 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(3)(ii)) ("Arranger... means a
person who regularly arranges for the extension of consumer credit by another person if... (2)
The person extending the credit is not a creditor.").
95 See FBB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,291 (§ 26.2(a)(3), comment 1).
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ranger's expertise about credit transactions would be sufficient to
ensure that compliance with Regulation Z would not be burdensome.
But think for a moment of the current market for residential real
estate. High interest rates and a shortage of mortgage funds have
introduced the era of "creative financing," including adjustable rate
mortgages, wraparound financing, and other novelties.90 One popu-
lar feature of many mortgage deals is the "seller take-back"-the
previous homeowner agrees to finance a portion of the sale price,
taking a second mortgage as security.9 7  Realtors and other brokers
are obvious intermediaries for these arrangements, helping negotiate
the deals, drafting or supplying mortgage forms to the client seller,
and so forth. In this context-one likely to occur frequently, not
rarely-the realtor is apparently an "arranger" and thus a creditor
fully responsible for Truth in Lending disclosures."" The Federal
Reserve Board belatedly acknowledged there could be some difficulty
in imposing disclosure responsibilities on realtors and other arrangers,
and has proposed to amend New Regulation Z to clarify TIL's cover-
age.99 Under the proposed rule, to be an arranger a person must both
develop or negotiate the credit terms and assist in completing the
credit documents. 00 This definition presumably would encompass
most mortgage loan and real estate brokers.' 0'
In short, except for this "arranger" complication, 102 the careful
(if strained) redefinition of the term creditor has largely eliminated
the confusion surrounding the multiple creditor problem. Occasional
questions may arise, but these may be resolved through the Federal
Reserve Board staff's commentary or, when necessary, by judicial
00 See Housing Yourself, supra note 18, at 404.
° See id. at 405-07.
91 See FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,291 (§ 226.2(a)(3), comment 1).
Proposed Rule to Define "Arranger of Credit," 46 Fed. Reg. 51,920 (1981) (proposed
amendment to § 226.2(a)(3)).
100 Id. at 51,920.
101 Id. Since seller financing is increasingly common, and since real estate brokers typically act
as intermediaries by negotiating credit terms and assisting in completing credit documents, see
id., the Board considered this definition necessary to assure that all meaningful credit terms arc
disclosed to buyers of dwellings, see id. at 51,921. The Board's proposal also identifies numerous
subquestions and suggests possible alternatives to the proposed rule, one being an exemption for
real estate brokers. See id. at 51,921-22.
102 The following enigma, raised at a recent meeting of the Federal Reserve Board's Consumer
Advisory Council, is indicative of the complexity lurking in the "arranger" concept.
Under revised Reg Z, if a professional loan broker gets a consumer a second mortgage from
a once-in-a-lifetime lender, if the broker neglects to disclose the right to rescind, and If the
consumer decides to rescind after consummation, who gets stuck? Is it the lender, who had
no duty to disclose, or is it the broker, who had no mortgage to tear up or payments to
refund?
Wash. Credit Letter, Nov. 2, 1981, at 6 (remarks of William O'Connor).
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decision. 10 3  Thus, the anomalies accompanying these revisions are
few; the Simplification Act here is basically well-executed.
B. Protecting Consumers: Making
Disclosures Clear
The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the Simplification
Act's efforts to clarify the form and substance of required disclosures.
Indeed, the changes made by the Act are, ironically, likely to produce
more, not less, opaque credit contracts. This results principally from
errors of execution, and creates practical difficulties for creditors and
consumers.
Most of the significant TIL changes concern closed-end transac-
tions. These include eliminating disclosure of many items, particu-
larly the computational steps leading up to the "amount fi-
nanced."11 4  This reduction in disclosure items is the heart of
"'simplification" in the pure sense of avoiding unnecessary clutter on
the statement. To clarify and emphasize the remaining disclosures,
the Simplification Act makes two changes in the format of the disclo-
sures. One of these deserves merely a note; disclosure statements must
now contain brief explanatory statements about each of five critical
disclosure items. 0 5 For example, "finance charge" must be accompa-
nied by a description such as "the dollar amount the credit will cost
you,"'108 and "annual percentage rate" by a description like "the cost
of your credit as a yearly rate."'0 7 Although these explanations add
words to the disclosure statement, the obvious intent, and effect, is to
increase consumer understanding.
A more dramatic change is that all the disclosures required for
closed-end transactions "shall be grouped together, shall be segregated
from everything else, and shall not contain any information not di-
rectly related to the [required] disclosures."108 Under Old Regulation
103 The courts may have to resolve the more subtle issues. In the health club cases mentioned
above, for example, courts were able to find that a financer's constant discount rate on install-
ment purchase contracts was a finance charge. See text accompanying note 83 supra. Even
though the financer will not be a "creditor" under the narrowed definition in New Regulation Z,
it would seem altogether appropriate for a court still to conclude that there is a dLsdosable
finance charge in such transactions.
0 See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
I- Id. § 1638(a)(8).
106 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902-03 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d)).
107 Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R § 226.18 (e)). Descriptions must also accompany the terms
"amount financed," "total of payments," and "total sale price." 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(8) (Supp.
IV 1980).
108 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,901 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 (a)).
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Z the disclosures had to be made "together,"' 0 9 but this was not
understood to mean that they could not be interspersed among other
terms on the contract document. The new requirement, though,
clearly contemplates total segregation of the required disclosures, ei-
ther on a separate statement or set apart from other information on
the contract document itself. The Federal Reserve Board staff com-
mentary explains that the TIL disclosures may be set off from other
contract information by "outlining them in a box," or may be sepa-
rated with "bold print dividing lines," "a different color background,"
or "a different type style."' 10  A footnote to New Regulation Z"'
makes it crystal clear that only a few limited bits of additional infor-
mation (acknowledgment of receipt, transaction date, consumer's
name, address, and account number) may be included in the "fed-
eral" box.
These revisions of disclosure format have implications beyond
merely necessitating industry-wide reprinting of forms. Documents
that combine the TIL disclosures with the actual credit contract will
almost certainly be longer, more verbose, and more redundant than
before. This problem, moreover, will be exacerbated by the new rules
on preemption of state law. In addition, Congress' effort to salvage
some form of mandatory itemization of the amount financed promises
to create further trouble for both consumers and creditors. Each of
these concerns merits some explanation.
Until now, TIL disclosures typically were integrated into the
credit contract. This meant that disclosed terms were part of the
contract, and such matters as the cash price, downpayment and
trade-in, components of the finance charge, description of the security
interest, prepayment penalty, and rebate provisions were stated one
time, satisfying both TIL and state contract law requirements. Under
the new Regulation, however, only the specified federal disclosures
can go in the federal box; all other contract terms and information
must appear elsewhere in the document. A number of the terms
required for the federal box are merely summary references-for
example, the consequences of prepayment, any demand feature, the
creditor's assumption policy"12-and will almost always require fur-
ther elaboration in the contract. The required disclosure concerning
' Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, § 226.8 (a).
"10 FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,322 (§ 226.17(a), comment 2).
' New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,901 n.37 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)
n.1); see FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,322 (§ 226.17(a), comment 5).
1' New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,903 (to be codified in 12 CF.R. § 226.18(l)(k)(q)).
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security interests permits identification of collateral "by... type," 13
which the Uniform Commercial Code 14 does not, necessitating a
more detailed description outside the federal box. The box must also
contain a statement referring the consumer to the contract for further
information about nonpayment, default, acceleration, and prepay-
ment. 15 All of this duplication and cross-referencing does not bode
well for "simplified" consumer credit contracts.
The new rules on preemption of state law will aggravate the
problem of redundancy and contract length. The Simplification Act
preempts "inconsistent" state laws,116 which New Regulation Z re-
states to mean only state disclosure laws that "contradict the require-
ments of the federal law."117  As the Regulation notes, a state law
requiring terminology different from that of TIL to describe the same
item, or similar to that of TIL to represent a different amount, would
be contradictory.1 8  This, however, does not shed any light on how
to evaluate the many state laws calling for disclosures in addition to
those that must now appear in the federal box. Read literally, no state
disclosure rules would "contradict" Regulation Z because no state law
prohibits certain disclosures being set out in a segregated format.
Rather, what exists at the state level is a variety of credit disclosure
statutes.11 9 Retail installment sales acts'20 commonly call for itemiza-
tion of cash price, downpayments, taxes, tag and title fees, service
policies, and the like. State insurance laws may call for detailed
explanations of coverages. Small loan laws' 2 may require disclosure
of disbursements or breakdowns of finance charges. Some of these
laws may require the state disclosures to be on the front of the con-
tract, above the consumer's signature, in a certain type size, or in
plain-English.122  A special paradox arises in any state where the
113 Id. at 20,903 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m)).
114 U.C.C. § 9-203 requires "a description of the collateral" in the security agreement.
Designation of the collateral by "type" is permissible only in the financing statement, under
U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
11s New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,903 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(p)).
118 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
117 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,906 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.28(a)).
11 Id.
" See generally Credit Research Center, Purdue University, Monograph No. 8, A Compila-
tion of Federal and State Laws Regulating Consumer Financial Services (1977).
'2 See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 476-1 to -38 (1976 & Supp. 19SO): Mass. Cen. Laws Ann.
ch. 255D, §§ 1-32 (West Supp. 1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069-6.01 to -.08 (Vernon
1971 & Supp. 1971-1980).
12 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-225 to -243 (West 1981); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§8 493.1 -.26 (1967 & Supp. 1981-1982).
122 See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-2 (1976); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 9 (West
Supp. 1981).
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legislature has adopted the old federal TIL disclosure rules as state
law; 12 3 the state law patterned on the old federal version will continue
to require itemizations that the new federal statute and Regulation
have displaced. Yet the state law hardly "contradicts" the federal, so
the state-required disclosures must still be made.
Thus, until the Federal Reserve Board rules on whether particu-
lar state provisions are contradictory and so preempted, creditors can
do little else but make all the state-required disclosures (outside the
federal box) .124 The Board staff's commentary acknowledges this
dilemma and permits creditors to "give state disclosures until the
Board formally determines that the state law is inconsistent."'' 25 This
avoids a Catch-22 predicament for creditors who would otherwise
have to guess whether particular state laws survived or were pre-
empted. But it also means that closed-end credit contracts will have to
be longer, with federal disclosures in a segregated box and the full
array of state law disclosures and contract provisions elsewhere in the
agreement. 26
The Simplification Act also contains a matter that is an example
of inexpedient legislative compromise. House conferees threatened to
123 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 5-2-301 to -313, 5-3-301 to -312 (1973); Utah Code Ann. §§
70B-2-301 to -313, 70B-3-301 to -312 (1980 & Supp. 1981).
124 If Congress is truly concerned about "information overload," see text accompanying notes
47-50 supra; note 49 supra, a simplification rule that produces longer and more intricate
contracts is counterproductive. For example, the writer has examined two versions of a retail
installment contract prepared by a large Midwestern bank, one in compliance with Old Regula-
tion Z, the other a prototype under New Regulation Z (on file at New York University Law
Review). The old version measures just under 15 inches in length, printed from top to bottom on
both sides. The new version is almost 21 inches long, printed from top to bottom on both sides,
with the federal box occupying a little more than a third of the front side. Among the curiosities
outside the federal box is a line for the Time Price Differential (a state law pseudonym for
finance charge) followed several lines later by a designation of when the finance charge begins to
accrue; presumably a consumer will know instinctively that the finance charge and the Time
Price Differential are one and the same.
'" FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,341 (§ 226.28(a), comment 4).
Creditors are not protected, however, if they choose not to give state disclosures, believing them
to be inconsistent with TIL, and the Board then determines otherwise. Id.
120 This also is the conclusion reached by the Federal Reserve Board in a regulatory analysis
published along with the new Regulation:
[R]eduction in required disclosures and changes in civil liability provisions in the Federal
law would not eliminate the necessity of continued compliance with the same require-
ments under a previously redundant state law. As a result, the change to new Federal
requirements would have the effect of increasing the number of required disclosures and
adding to the length of forms.
Regulatory Analysis of Revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,941, 20,949 app. A (1981). The
same analysis concluded that since creditors would be prohibited from making disclosures using
any preempted state term or form, "the practical effect would be to make it very difficult to use
a combined contract and Federal Truth in Lending disclosure." Id.
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hold up the Simplification bill (and thus the entire Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, of which it was a part)
unless the Senate conferees agreed to restore some form of itemization
of the amount financed.'2 7  The result is a provision'- requiring the
creditor to disclose to the consumer that such an itemization is avail-
able on request. The clutter and potential format problems created by
this disclosure of the right to more disclosure are bad enough. 1
Worse, though, is that the statute requires that these itemization
disclosures include prepaid finance charges. 130  In truth, prepaid fi-
nance charges simply are not part of the amount financed, 131 and it
-' The story of these maneuverings is related in Climo, Simplification and Reform of the
Truth in Lending Act, J. Retail Banking, June 1980, at 55-56. See also note 51 supra.
'2 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
12 New Regulation Z and the Board staffs commentary help matters in some degree. Credi-
tors may give the itemization automatically, without having to disclose the consumer's optional
right to request it. New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902403 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
226.18(c)); FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,328 (§ 226.18(c), comment 1).
The consumer's request apparently may be by cheek-box despite the statutes requirement that
the request be initialed. Compare New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902 (to be codified in
12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c)(2)), with 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 19S0). When creditors do
give the itemization, it must be outside the federal box, New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at
20,901 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1)), which means that creditors may be able to
integrate it into other contract documents. For transactions subject to the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976), the statement of estimated settlement costs
required under that Act will suffice as the itemization of amount financed under Regulation Z.
New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902 n.39 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c) n.1).
But problems remain. Must the items constituting the amount financed be disclosed to-
gether elsewhere in the contract, or may those items be interspersed with other contract informa-
tion or with state law disclosures? To what extent does this disclosure preempt only state law
itemizations that may be more or less complete? May the creditor indicate mathematical
relations among the items constituting the amount financed? This is especially important because
with the inclusion of prepaid finance charges, see text accompanying notes 130-32 infra, the
"itemization" just does not add up. Indeed, even a congressional staff counsel who worked
extensively on the Simplification Act misunderstood the arithmetic. Explaining the itemization
requirement, she concludes, "IT addition, so that the itemicd amounts equal tie amount
financed, there must also be a disclosure of the total amount of prepaid finance charges.- Climo,
supra note 127, at 58 (emphasis added).
' 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 1980) calls for disclosure of -the total amount of
any charges described in the preceding subparagraph (A)(iii)." That provision refers to "any
charges which are part of the finance charge but which will be paid by the consumer before or at
the time of the consummation of the transaction, or have been withheld from the proceeds of the
credit." Id. § 1638(a)(2)(A)(iii).
3I The finance charge and the amount financed are mutually exclusive concepts: the finance
charge represents the price paid for the use of a certain sum (the amount financed) over time.
Prepaid finance charges are merely a subcategory, or component, of the finance charge. Both the
revised Act and new Regulation clearly recognize the relationship by specifically requiring that
any prepaid finance charge be subtracted from the principal in calculating the amount financed.
Id. § 1638(a) (2)(A)(iii); New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
226.18(b)(3)). For example, if a consumer borrows $100,000 and the creditor charges the
consumer two "points," which are withheld from the loan proceeds, the amount financed is
$98,000, and the $2,000 worth of points is a prepaid finance charge.
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borders on deception to itemize them as such. 132  Perhaps the Federal
Reserve or its staff could rectify this situation-one directly opposed to
the spirit of TIL-by merely authorizing creditors to call this listing
something other than "itemization of the amount financed," thus
reducing the possibility that consumers will be misled. "Transaction
disbursements" might be one alternative label, and there are undoubt-
edly other benign descriptions.
In sum, the original simplification goal of a reduced number of
disclosures highlighted in a segregated "federal box" has been consid-
erably diluted. The reforms, in this case, have not been artfully
executed. The burden now shifts to the state legislatures to adjust their
own disclosure laws to reduce redundancies and duplication. The
burden shifts back to Congress, in this writer's view, to delete or
amend the required itemization of the amount financed at the earliest
opportunity.
III
PROBLEMS OF MARKET DYNAMICS
Some of the anomalies generated by the Simplification Act derive
from the limitations inhering in the Act's assumptions about the pur-
pose of disclosure and the nature of the credit market. Certain of the
Act's provisions, though, also offer the opportunity to test these as-
sumptions and, perhaps, to refine TIL regulation.
A. Timing of Disclosure
The stated goal of Truth in Lending disclosures is to influence
consumer credit shopping behavior, 133 yet, for closed-end transac-
tions, TIL disclosure comes too late to do so. 13 4 Under Truth in
Lending, closed-end disclosures need not be given until "consumma-
tion" of the transaction. 35 Because the disclosures are so transaction-
132 This writer has spoken to several experienced creditor attorneys who have wondered
whether this itemization disclosure is meant to change the rules on computing finance charges
and annual percentage rates. If they are uncertain, how will a typical consumer read the
statement?
133 See text accompanying notes 23-24, 47-50 supra; note 50 supra.
See Landers & Rohner, supra note 4, at 715-16.
1 A credit transaction is consummated when the consumer becomes contractually obligated,
Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, §§ 226.2(kk), 226.8(a); New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at
20,893, 20,901 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(a)(13), 226.17(b)). In addition, Old
Regulation Z provided for the use of estimates only when absolutely necessary at the last moment
when timely disclosures could be made. Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, § 226.6(f).
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specific, preparation of the disclosure statement must await the nego-
tiation of all transaction details. By then, however, the consumer is
psychologically committed to the transaction and unlikely to go credit
shopping. 36
The new Act and Regulation make some headway against this
problem, although difficulties persist. For one thing, they relax the
rules on credit advertising, 37 so that creditors may now be more
willing to put specific credit features in their ads. The Act also re-
quires the Federal Reserve Board to experiment with the collection
and publication of annual percentage rates (APRs) for typical loan
transactions in selected standard metropolitan statistical areas.""
These two innovations may increase the early flow of general price-
tag credit information to consumers.
A more significant change is the requirement of early transac-
tional disclosure in certain residential mortgage transactions. For
most such transactions the existing Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act 39 (RESPA) already requires the creditor to provide written "good
faith" estimates of settlement costs within three days after receiving a
consumer's application.140  Congress reasoned that it would be no
great burden for the creditor to provide estimated credit cost disclo-
sures at the same time, 41 and TIL now provides for such early disclo-
sures in transactions subject to RESPA. 1 42
For transactions other than residential mortgages, the new Regu-
lation makes a subtle change that may encourage a form of early
disclosure. Although disclosures must still be given no later than con-
summation, creditors may now make estimated disclosures before
then, as long as the disclosures are "based on the best information
reasonably available" and are designated as estimates.143 Thus any
creditor is free to make TIL disclosures as soon as it is able to make
reasonable estimates about transaction terms.
'1 See Landers & Rohner, supra note 4, at 715-16; Federal Reserve Board, Proposal to Revise
Regulation Z, 45 Fed. Beg. 29,702, 29,726 (1980).
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1663, 1664(d) (Supp. IV 1980); New Regulation Z. supra note 8, at
20,901, 20,905 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.16, 226.24).
138 15 U.S.C. § 1646 (Supp. IV 1980).
1 3 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976). The implementing regulation is Regulation X, 24 C.F.R.
pt. 3500 (1981).
140 24 C.F.R. § 3500.6(a) (1981).
1' See S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39, at 17, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 294.
142 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); see New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,893,
20,903 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(a), 226.19(a)).
143 See New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(c)(2)).
note 148 infra.
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An obvious question for both residential mortgages and other
transactions is what happens if some of the credit terms change be-
tween the time of estimated disclosure and the consummation of the
transaction. This is particularly problematic in mortgage transactions
in which there may be a considerable delay between application and
settlement, and in which the creditor's commitment may be tied to a
rate prevailing at the time of settlement. New Regulation Z requires
redisclosure in such a case, but only if the disclosed annual percentage
rate changes by more than certain specified tolerances.'44 If the APR
changes, all changed terms (finance charge, schedule of payments,
etc.) must be redisclosed; if only non-APR terms change, no new
disclosure is called for. 45
Since these provisions are new, their impact is uncertain. One
potential problem is that despite the "estimate" labels on early disclo-
sures, consumers may rely on those figures and then be unhappily
surprised when a higher rate is disclosed at settlement. Moreover, if
the change is in non-APR terms, such as the prepayment penalty or
the payment schedule, no new disclosure has to be given, and con-
sumers might legitimately complain they were sandbagged by the
earlier estimates. Thus, the early disclosures could have a potentially
deceptive effect if there are significant changes at consummation.
More constructively, creditors might devise a form of early dis-
closure that will obviate the need for precise disclosures at consumma-
tion. In the first draft of New Regulation Z, the Federal Reserve
Board did propose an "alternate shopping disclosure" device that,
essentially, would have permitted creditors to comply with TIL by
issuing preprinted flyers describing the credit terms for a typical array
of transactions. 146  Even though this novel proposal did not reappear
explicitly in the second draft 147 or in the final version of the Regula-
tion, the new Regulation Z may implicitly authorize it. Consider this
144 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,902, 20,903 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§
226.17(f), 226.19(b)).
145 See FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,333 (§ 226.19(b), comment 2).
146 45 Fed. Reg. 29,702, 29,726 (1980) (proposed § 226.11(h)).
147 45 Fed. Reg. 80,648 (1980). The Board noted that the great majority of the comments on
the proposal were negative, then added:
In view of these comments, the Board is eliminating the concept of alternate shopping
disclosures from the regulation. The Board remains committed to enhancing the credit-
shopping function of the act by encouraging early disclosure of credit terms. However, the
Board believes that this commitment can be carried out by several less dramatic means,
which are reflected in the new proposal. Among the revisions which should encourage
early disclosure are the more flexible rules regarding the timing of disclosures and the use
of estimates.
Id. at 80,676.
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possibility: an auto dealer prepares flyers or brochures showing var-
ious balances to be financed and disclosing the APR and other perti-
nent terms. As soon as a prospective customer indicates the approxi-
mate amount to be financed, the dealer hands the customer the flyer
that contains all the necessary disclosures for such a transaction. As
long as the APR does not vary (and in many cases it will be a con-
stant), the dealer has fully satisfied his Truth in Lending responsibili-
ties even though the consummated deal may be based on a smaller or
larger amount financed, or on a different payment schedule. 4 , By
using preprinted flyers, the creditor might easily avoid the violations
involved in computing specific transactional figures; consumers,
meanwhile, would receive early disclosures, accurate in all respects,
for transactions approximately like the ones they eventually enter.
From its inception, a basic weakness of Truth in Lending has
been that closed-end disclosures come too late to influence consumer
shopping in that transaction.1 49 It is doubtful that the changes in the
new Regulation can dramatically alter this fact. The combination of
mandatory early disclosure for residential mortgage transactions, op-
tional estimated disclosures in other transactions, and the limited
requirements for rediscosure, however, may present the first real
opportunities to assess TIL's usefulness as a shopping tool. In so doing,
it should refine our understanding of the inherent limitations of credit
disclosure statutes.
B. Open-end Credit Redefined
The distinction between "open-end" and "closed-end" 150 credit is
basic to Truth in Lending; wholly different disclosure rules apply to
8 The Official Staff Commentary lends further support to this possible practice by stressing
the creditor's flexibility:
Disclosures may be estimated when the exact information is unknown at the time disclo.
sures are made. Information is unknown if it is not reasonably available to the creditor at
the time the disclosures are made. The "reasonably available" standard requires that the
creditor, acting in good faith, exercise due diligence in obtaining information .... The
creditor normally may rely on the representations of other parties in obtaining informa-
tion. For example, the creditor might look to the consumer for the time of consummation.
... The creditor may utilize estimates in making disclosures even though the creditor
knows that more precise information %vill be available by the point of consummation.
FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,324 (§ 2206.17(c)(2), comment 1).
149 See generally Landers & Rohner, supra note 4, at 715-37; Whitford, supra note 4, at
405-35.
1-' Since 1969, Regulation Z has defined only -open-end credit," leaving all other credit
arrangements to be called "other than open-end credit." The new Regulation finally dignifies the
universally used term "closed-end credit" with its own definition. New Regulation Z, supra note
8, at 20,893 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10)).
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each. The closed-end rules emphasize aggregate credit costs for a
fixed-term, one-time transaction, whereas the open-end disclosures
stress the factors that may influence the charges periodically imposed
on a continuing, replenishing line of credit.
The original Regulation Z definition of open-end credit focused
on the revolving nature of the account: the consumer had to be able to
"make purchases or obtain loans, from time to time,"'' and the
creditor was permitted to compute a finance charge from time to time
on an outstanding unpaid balance. 152 That regulatory definition also
added a criterion not specifically required by the statute, namely that
the customer "has the privilege of paying the balance in full or in
installments."' 153 This formulation adequately separated credit-card
and related open-end plans from more conventional closed-end fi-
nancing, and only a few noteworthy issues surfaced.
One issue that did arise was operational: could a creditor charac-
terize an account as open-end but still reverify the customer's credit
history before each use of the account? When the Federal Reserve
Board staff authorized this practice, 154 many institutional lenders
began designating their plans as open-end, providing a maximum line
of credit the consumer could draw upon through a simple voucher
technique without the need for a formal reapplication or for a formal
consolidation or refinancing. Creditors thereby eased their paperwork
burdens yet retained control over subsequent advances. The new Act
codifies the creditor's ability to verify a customer's credit information
from time to time without destroying the open-end character of the
account. 55
A second concern was that certain creditors were offering ostensi-
bly open-end lines of credit in circumstances in which continuing or
repeated business with the same customers in fact was very doubtful.
For example, sellers of pianos, or encyclopedias, or similar "big-
ticket" transactions sometimes made open-end disclosures. 50 The
Federal Trade Commission urged Congress to prohibit such "spu-
rious" use of open-end plans, since consumers were being deprived of
important information about the transaction when creditors made
improper open-end disclosures.' 57 In particular, the consumer was
,51 Old Regulation Z, supra note 8, § 226.2(x)(1).
's Id. § 226.2(x)(3).
'5 Id. § 226.2(x)(2).
'5 Federal Reserve Board Public Information Letter No. 525, [1969-1974 Truth-in-Lending
Special Releases] Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 30,737.
'- 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
' Simplification Hearings, supra note 39, at 131-32, 135-36 (statement of Lewis H. Coldfarb).
,57 Id. at 132.
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not told the total finance charge, the total of payments, or the de-
ferred payment price. 158
The result was an amended statutory definition in which credit is
"open-end" if the creditor "reasonably contemplates repeated transac-
tions."' 9 This criterion, emphasizing the creditor's state of mind,
should help eliminate the feigned use of open-end disclosures in trans-
actions that are pretty clearly one-shot deals. Yet this attack on spu-
rious open-end credit plans could leave as many questions unanswered
as it resolves. Congress apparently expected that the new provision
would prohibit open-end disclosures for nonrepetitive, big-ticket pur-
chases like automobiles or home improvements.1 0 The Federal Re-
serve, however, focuses not on individual purchases but on whether
the credit plan is likely to involve repeat business. In some cases the
two approaches lead to the same result, but in others they do not. The
Board's definition is susceptible to a reading that diverges somewhat
from congressional understanding. The revised regulatory definition
emphasizes that an entire credit "plan" may be open-end even though
only portions of it will be reused. 1 For example, a financial institu-
tion might offer a combined credit plan including a general-purpose
credit card, cash advances, check overdraft privileges, and a credit
line available for automobile credit or other more occasional transac-
tions such as educational loans or even home mortgages. If the credi-
tor "reasonably contemplates" repeat business under one or more of
the subplans, the entire account, including the big-ticket auto and
mortgage loans, could be handled through open-end disclosures.
This opportunity to use open-end disclosures for combined credit
plans is apparently not limited to banks, credit unions, and other
depository institutions. Finance companies regularly anticipate repeat
business through refinancings, consolidations, new advances and the
like, and these companies have recently been expanding their array of
credit services. 162 There is no reason their plans could not properly be
158 Id.
,59 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (Supp. IV 1980); see New Regulation Z, supra note8. at 20,893 (to be
codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20)(i)).
"' See S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 39, at 10, [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 287-8S.
In addition, Congress intended to proscribe open-end disclosures for door-to-door sales and for
purchases away from home-transactions also unlikely to be repeated. Id. But see 124 Cong.
Rec. 13,149 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Schmitt) (Act does not -require retailers to quiz their credit
applicants in order to find out how often they intended to make purchases under the plan.').
181 The Board staff's commentary observes: "The creditor must epect repeated dealings with
the consumer under the credit plan as a whole, and need not believe the consumer will reuse a
particular feature of the plan." FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42. at 50,294 (§
226.2(a)(20), comment 3).
1'2 See Survey of Finance Companies, 1980, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 398, 399-401 (1981).
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open-end. Indeed, even more specialized retailers, such as appliance,
furniture, or jewelry stores, may "reasonably" expect to have cus-
tomers return for accessories, additions, or replacements.0 3
Thus, as institutions broaden their range of services, it is easy to
visualize a substantial shifting of credit plans from conventional
closed-end arrangements to the more fluid open-end pattern, resulting
in a decline of closed-end plans available to consumers. Consumer
transactions that Congress expected to be accompanied by closed-end
disclosures will therefore require only open-end ones. In this instance,
however, the anomaly results from Congress' failure to appreciate
fully the changing nature of the credit market. The Federal Reserve
Board appears more attuned to the seemingly inevitable shifts that
will occur as institutional creditors create more imaginative combina-
tions of financial services, and as banks and other depositories consoli-
date credit and electronic fund-transfer plans.
As a matter of policy, moreover, the absorption of most tradi-
tional closed-end credit transactions into open-end plans is not cause
for mourning. Although open-end disclosures lack some of the preci-
sion and aggregate totals that closed-end disclosures provide, 04 the
recurring nature of open-end disclosures through periodic state-
ments'6 5 and mandatory change-of-terms notices"' may provide con-
sumers with a better continuing picture of their credit transactions.
This would be particularly true if consumers think of their credit
obligations less as a collection of one-time, fixed-term arrangements
and more as a stream of variable financial commitments that they can
modulate from time to time with the aid of Truth in Lending's
open-end disclosures.
163 The Board staff, though, indicates that it would be "more reasonable" for a thrift Institu-
tion (such as a credit union) to contemplate repeat transactions, and thus to use open-end
disclosures, than for an aluminum siding seller to do so. See FRB Official Staff Commentary,
supra note 42, at 50,294 (§ 226.2(a)(20), comment 3). Since the statute and Regulation require
only that the creditor "reasonably contemplate" repeat business, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(1) (Supp. IV
1980); New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,893 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20)(1)),
it is unclear why the Board staff introduces relative reasonableness in the commentary. Even If,
by inference, it is less reasonable for, say, a piano seller to expect repeat business than it would be
for a bank, does that make it unreasonable? What of future needs for a piano bench, piano light,
tuning, and sheet music?
I" See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
16 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,895, 20,896 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§
226.5(b)(2), 226.7).
I" Id. at 20,897 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)).




THE LIMrrs OF DISCLOSURE: TRUTH IN
LENDING AND VARIABLE RATES
The new provisions for early disclosure and open-end credit,
though not without their problems, stretch the boundaries of con-
sumer protection somewhat. However, an increasingly important
form of credit offering, floating or variable rate transactions, reveals
the limits of disclosure reform for consumer protection.
In variable rate lending, instead of a fixed rate and a fixed
amortization schedule, the interest rate is adjusted from time to time.
As the rate changes, so does the payment schedule, the total of pay-
ments, and the overall transaction costs. The rate changes are gener-
ally pegged to an independent index not controlled by the lender, and
therefore are subject to the volatility of whatever market produces this
index. Adjustable rates have thus far been found primarily in home
mortgages, 167 although they theoretically could be used in any form of
credit transaction, including conventional installment loans or open-
end plans.168
In the mortgage market, lenders have been successful in getting
regulatory agencies to grant them authority to make variable rate
loans. As of mid-1981, all national banks 69 and all federal savings and
loan associations (plus federal mutual savings banks) 1 70 are authorized
to make a wide range of variable rate mortgages. Federal credit
unions now have equivalent authority.171 State-chartered depository
institutions and other mortgage lenders often have comparable varia-
ble rate lending authority under state law.'72 Federal legislation
preempting state usury ceilings for first-lien residential mortgages 73
has further enhanced financial institutions' ability to offer variable
"7 See note 18 supra.
168 Creditors can see the potential for variable rate lending beyond mortgages. See, e.g., Sale,
Floating Rate Installment Loans: An Option for Increased Profitability, J. Retail Bandng, Sept.
1980, at 1. New Regulation Z clearly contemplates variable-rate open-end credit. New Regula-
tion Z, supra note 8, at 20,896 nn.12 & 15 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6(a)(2) n.2,
226.7(d) n.2).
169 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Final Rule on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, 46
Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pt. 29) [hereinafter OCC Mortgage Rule].
170 Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Final Rule on Adjustable Mortgage Loan Instruments,
12 C.F.R. § 545.6-.6-14 (1981), as amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (19S) [hereinafter FHLBB
Final Rule].
171 The National Credit Union Administration has finalized regulations to authorize adjusta-
ble rate lending by federal credit unions. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,669 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
§ 701.21-6B).
172 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1981).
173 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (Supp. IV 1980).
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rate loans. The policy debate swirling around these alternatives to
conventional mortgages has centered on their general desirability as a
response to restricted mortgage funds, and on the need for substantive
consumer protections such as limits on the amount of rate changes, 174
as well as on the question of disclosure.17 5
For purchase money mortgages in particular, which have always
been structured as closed-end transactions under Truth in Lending,
the disclosure paradox is self-evident: How is it possible to disclose
specific transactional costs that enable the consumer to compare mort-
gage offerings when those costs are inherently unknowable and unpre-
dictable? What possible shopping role can Truth in Lending disclo-
sures play in a market increasingly dominated by credit arrangements
whose most critical term-the price-is beyond calculation or con-
trol?176
That the generic description "variable rate" can encompass myr-
iad transaction types17 7 provides a further stumbling block for disclo-
174 See generally Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Report to Congress: New
Mortgages For Financing Homes Need Uniform and Comprehensive Consumer Safeguards
(1981) [hereinafter Comptroller General's Report); Renegotiable Rate Mortgage Proposals of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
[hereinafter Renegotiable Rate Hearings].
17- See Comptroller General's Report, supra note 174, at 29-31.
176 The dilemma has been more colorfully described:
To understand a variable rate mortgage a consumer would need to take four people to the
loan closing-a lawyer to explain the terminology; an accountant to calculate the closing
costs; a soothsayer to predict the future; and a holy man to pray that the interest rates do
not escalate rapidly.
Wash. Credit Letter, June 29, 1981, at 4 (quoting Jim Boyle, Consumer Federation of America).
177 See generally Comptroller General's Report, supra note 174. An earlier regulation of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), for example, approved mortgage transactions In
which, by contract, the rate was adjusthble each year by reference to the FHLBBs cost-of-funds
index. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Final Rule on Variable Rate Mortgages, 44 Fed. Reg.
32,199, 32,201 (1979). Renegotiable rate mortgages ("rollovers") also were approved by the
FHLBB; these contemplated a short-term obligation (three to five years), but with payments
amortized over a full 25- or 30-year mortgage term; as the balloon obligation within each
rollover period came due, the lender would refinance that balloon at prevailing rates. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, Final Rule on Renegotiable Rate Mortgage Instruments, 45 Fed. Reg.
24,108 (1980). Each of these approved mortgage forms contained restrictions on the amount and
frequency of step increases and the total amount of rate increase over the life of the mortgage.
The variable rate mortgage regulation permitted rate changes of no more than one-half of one
percent a year, with a maximum net increase of 2.5% over the life of the loan. 44 Fed. Reg. at
32,201. The renegotiable rate mortgage regulation, by contrast, authorized aggregate Increases
up to five percent over the life of the mortgage. 45 Fed. Reg. at 24,111.
The most recent regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and of the FI-ILBB
have authorized broader and less-restricted forms of variable rate mortgage, including mort-
gages with negative amortization features. (In negative amortization transactions, the Install-
ment payments do not cover the full interest charge for the period. The unpaid interest then Is
added to the unpaid loan principal. The effect is that the loan balance increases rather than
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sure. Different mortgage offerings may be tied to different indexes'17
and have different rate-change intervals, options for payment-sched-
ule adjustment, 179 conditions for refinancing, minimum or maximum
caps on rate changes, base-rate formulas, 0 or rate-adjustment carry-
over provisions. 181  Negative amortization features'12 may be explic-
ifly built in, or may merely be contingent on the rate index or on the
decreases over time.) The FHLBB's current regulation on Adjustable Mortgage Loan Instru-
ments imposes no limitations on the amount or frequency of rate changes, and permits unlimited
negative amortization as long as payments are rescheduled to pay off the obligation within 40
years. FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152 (to be codified In 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a).
The regulations of the OCC are more restrictive. Rate increases are held to two percent per year,
with no single adjustment of more than five percent allowed: there is no cap on the total rate
adjustment over the life of the loan, but the regulation does limit the maximum amount of
negative amortization. OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,943-44 (to be codified in 12
C.F.R. § 29.5).
Yet another form of variable rate mortgage recognized In the Federal Reserve Board staff's
commentary on Regulation Z is the "shared appreciation" loan, whereby (in exchange for a
reduced contract rate) the consumer agrees to share with the lender some portion of the
appreciated value of the home when it is sold. See FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note
42, at 50,329 (§ 226.18(f), comment 5). Loans with capped monthly payments but a -floating"
rate also have been initiated in several areas. The most publicized has been the -\Vahovia
plan," initiated by a North Carolina bank in 1980. See Hill, supra note 18, at 20.
1'8 The OCC's regulation stipulates that national banks must use one of three indexes. OCC
Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,943 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.4). The Home Loan
Bank Board authorizes four specific indexes, but also permits -any interest-rate index as long as
it is "readily verifiable by the borrower and is beyond the control of the association.- FHLBB
Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(c)(2)).
' National banks may adjust either the amount of installment payments or the rate of
amortization, or both, so long as payments are adjusted at least every five years to permit the
loan to be fully repaid within a 30-year term. OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,944 (to
be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(d)). Federal savings and loan associations may implement rate
adjustments in any fashion so long as the loan is repayable within 40 years. FHLBB Final Rule,
supra note 170, at 24,152 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(I)).
"' To facilitate sale of mortgages in the secondary market, lenders want all mortgage loans
made during a given period to be subject to rate adjustment at the same time and with reference
to the same base rate. This led the Home Loan Bank Board to include in its (now repealed)
renegotiable rate mortgage regulation permission to treat all mortgages made within a six-month
period as controlled by the index rate at the end of that period. See 45 Fed. Reg. 24,10S, 24,111
(1980). This was severely criticized, see, e.g., Letter from Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal to Hon.
John Dalton, Acting Chairman, FHLBB (Dec. 31, 19S0) (on file at New York University Law
Review). The current FHLBB and OCC regulations bar the use of a base rate set after loan
consummation, but permit lenders to extend the first rate-adjustment date so that mortgages
may be"grouped" thereafter. See OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,937; FHLBB Final
Rule, supra note 170, at 24,151.
"I The OCC's regulation specifically permits lenders to carry over unused changes in the
index into subsequent rate adjustment periods. OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,943
(to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(c)(4)). Because the Bank Board sets no limits on rate
adjustments, and lenders are free to decline to impose rate increases when otherwise due, there
apparently is an implicit carry-over authorization for federal savings and loan associations.
FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(c)(1)).
182 See note 177 supra.
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consumer's election. With all these possible combinations of variables,
disclosure to allow side-by-side comparison of alternative mortgages
becomes virtually impossible-at least if the goal is to permit con-
sumers to make knowing distinctions among mortgage alternatives,
and to choose the mortgage form that best suits them.183
The disclosure rules for variable rate transactions under the new
Regulation Z can best be described as tentative or sketchy, perhaps
even embryonic. This is somewhat understandable for several reasons.
First, the Federal Reserve Board's earlier attempts to specify variable
rate disclosures were extremely limited and clumsy; 184 the Truth in
Lending statute itself does not even mention variable rates, and thus
provides the Board with no statutory guidance. Second, the Board is
aware that variable rate loans are new and untested and that the
agencies promoting them are seeking "broad flexibility" 185 for institu-
tional lenders. These agencies acknowledged that comments from
lenders had urged that disclosures be kept simple so as not to inhibit
the growth of these types of mortgages. 186
For variable rate, closed-end transactions, Regulation Z requires
the creditor to disclose: "(1) The circumstances under which the [an-
nual percentage] rate may increase; (2) Any limitations on the in-
183 Although the possible permutations for variable-rate instruments are virtually unlimited,
secondary market investors may impose a measure of standardization on mortgage offerings by
their usually cautious investment policies. For example, in May 1981, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) announced a "pilot program" to purchase mortgages with
rates adjustable annually by at least two percent; but FHLMC will not, under that program,
purchase mortgages with negative amortization or extended-term features. See FHLMC Sets
Guides on Mortgages, Washington Post, May 29, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 1. The other major
secondary market investor, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) announced
in June 1981 that it would soon begin purchasing eight different varieties of adjustable rate
mortgages. See U.S. Agency Clears Way for Sale of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, Washington
Post, June 26, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 2.
11 The Board had issued an interpretation calling for the disclosure of any variable rate
feature, 34 Fed. Reg. 11,083 (1969) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.810 (1970) (repealed 1977)),
before the effective date of Old Regulation Z. Not until 1977 did the Board amend Regulation Z
to call for explicit variable rate disclosures, including an example reflecting a hypothetical
increase of one-quarter of one percent based on the original amount financed (a most Implausi-
ble hypotheticall). Old Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(8) (1981). After the Bank Board
issued its regulation on renegotiable rate mortgages, the Federal Reserve Board staff announced
that such mortgages could be disclosed either as variable rate mortgages under the disclosure rule
just cited, or as balloon obligations subject to the old Regulation, Old Regulation Z, supra note
8, § 226.8(b)(3). Federal Reserve Board Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0172, [1980] 5
Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 31,875, at 67,050. For further background, see Landers & Chand-
ler, The Truth in Lending Act and Variable-Rate Mortgages and Balloon Notes, 1976 Am. B.
Foundation Research J. 35.
185 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's words. FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at
24,148.
186 See, e.g., OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,940 (OCC); FHLBB Final Rule,
supra note 170, at 24,150 (FHLBB).
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crease; (3) The effect of an increase; and (4) An example of the
payment terms that would result from an increase."'687 The Board
staff's commentary explains' 88 that the "circumstances" would include
identification of the index to which the rate is tied, plus events that
may trigger an increase (time intervals, minimum movement of the
index, etc.). "Limitations" refers to caps on periodic increases and on
aggregate increases over the term of the loan, but does not include
usury ceilings. 18 9 The "effect" of an increase would be an adjustment
to the number or amount of payments.1 0 The "hypothetical exam-
ple" may be either general or transaction-specific.' 0' This would
allow the creditor to 9how, for example, either what a presumed
increase would do to a hypothetical mortgage, or what it would do to
the consumer's specific loan.
But consider the possibly critical information that this rule does
not require to be disclosed. There is no disclosure of the historical
movement of the index used, or any mention of where and how the
consumer can verify that index. There is no indication of the base rate
from which index fluctuations will be measured, which is not neces-
sarily the same as the contract rate. -192 The rule does not require new
disclosures at or before the time rate changes are implemented to alert
the consumer to possible payment schedule changes. Nor is there any
explanatory information to warn the consumer that an increase in the
number of payments is more costly than an increase in the amount of
payments. Consumer proponents have argued vehemently that credi-
tors be required to include a "worst case" hypothetical0 3 to depict the
maximum possible increase and its consequences. Regulation Z, how-
ever, does not require this information, probably in part because of
the difficulty of determining what the worst scenario could be for
8 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,903 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(f)).
:98 FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,330 (§ 226.18(f)(1), comment 1).
s9 Id. (§ 226.18(f)(2), comment 1).
:9 Id. (§ 226.18(f)(3), comment 1).
1 Id. (§ 226.18(f)(4), comment 1).
192 See note 180 supra.
93 See, e.g., B. Rosenthal, Mortgage Adjustability and Mortgage Affordability: The Con-
sumer Side 3 (Sept. 22, 1981) (Statement of Cong. Benjamin Rosenthal during hearings before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1981) (on file at New
York University Law Review)); Renegotiable Rate Hearings, supra note 174, at 84-85 (testimony
of Ellen Broadman, Consumers' Union); id. at 47 (statement of U.S. Office of Consumer
Affairs); id. at 78 (statement of N.Y. State Consumer Protection Board). See also Comptroller
General's Report, supra note 174, at 29-30.
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loans with no rate-change cap, or with negative amortization or
shared appreciation features. 194
Even if all this information were added to the disclosures, it
would merely provide a sharper picture of how that mortgage works.
It would say nothing about other variable rate plans, nor indicate
whether that lender offers alternative terms. Furthermore, and all too
obviously, even if such comparative data were included, none of it
would reveal how the rate index for any of the mortgage alternatives
would actually behave in the future.
Recent regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
contain rather extensive disclosure rules of their own. 9 s These rules
would supply some of the information suggested above. They may,
however, create new problems of synchronization with New Regula-
tion Z. Both agencies require that the consumer be told where the
index can be found and verified and require some historical data
about its movement. 96 Both require advance notices before a rate
change is implemented.0 7  Both regulations include a model disclo-
sure statement whose use is mandatory in the case of the FHLBB I98
and optional in the case of the OCC. 9 Although the regulations
differ sharply in the substantive constraints they impose on variable
rate transactions, their approaches to disclosure are similar. Problems
surface, however, when these disclosure mechanisms are aligned with
those of Regulation Z.
"I In the first draft proposal for revised Regulation Z, the Federal Reserve Board did not
require a hypothetical example. 45 Fed. Reg. 29,702, 29,747-48 (1980) (proposed §
226.11(f)(5)). The second draft proposal reinstated essentially the same language that now
appears in the final version, and the Board explained: "In view of the enormous variety In
variable rate provisions, the Board does not believe that any specific requirement In the regula-
tion will necessarily reflect the best example for a particular creditor's plan." 45 Fed. Reg.
80,648, 80,681 (1980).
"0 OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,944-45 (to be codified in 12 G.F.R. § 29.8)
(OCC); FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152-53 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-4a(f)) (FHLBB).
196 OCC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,944 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(a))
(OCC); FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-4a(c)(2), (e)) (FHLBB).
1170CC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,944 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(b))
(OCC); FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(o))
(FHLBB).
"" FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152-53 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
4a(f)).
.0CC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,944, 18,945-46 (1981) (to be codified in 12
C.F.R. § 29.8(a) & app.).
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Although Regulation Z specifically says that disclosures made
under other agency regulations "may be substituted for"200 the varia-
ble rate disclosures required under Regulation Z, there is some possi-
ble friction regarding the timing of these disclosures. TIL disclosures
are not required until three days after application (for transactions
also subject to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act), -01 or until
consummation.2 02 The OCC's regulation stipulates that its disclosure
must be given when the bank supplies a loan application form or other
written information concerning mortgage loans; 203 the FHLBB disclo-
sures are due "at the time of receipt of an application, or upon
request. °20 4 Presumably there is no problem if the "substituted" dis-
closures are given earlier than legally necessary under Regulation Z.
But if the OCC or FHLBB disclosures are in fact to substitute for those
mandated by Regulation Z, they would probably have to be given
separately, yet apparently still be subject to other Regulation Z con-
straints such as the requirement that any "estimated" disclosure be so
designated.205
Other problems of format arise, Except for the "hypothetical
example," the variable rate disclosure under Regulation Z must be
within the federal box. 206 But this is patently impossible if OCC or
FHLBB disclosures are given separately at the time of application.
Implicitly at least, Regulation Z must authorize placing the substi-
tuted disclosures outside the box; otherwise a creditor would have to
be prepared to give complete Truth in Lending disclosures at the time
it hands out application forms, which is also patently impossible.
Further, the OCC and FHLBB disclosures will be lengthy, multipage
documents, which seems incompatible with Regulation Z's "clear and
conspicuous" requirement. In addition, these disclosures may use ter-
minology inconsistent with that of TIL (e.g., "interest rate" vs. "an-
nual percentage rate"). Do these inconsistencies make a difference?
The Federal Reserve Board staffs commentary may need to clarify
these issues sooner rather than later.
More startling is the fact that incorrect disclosures under the
OCC and FHLBB regulations will apparently carry Truth in Lending
0 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,903 n.43 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(f)
n.5).
201 Id. at 20,903 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a)); see text accompanying notes 139-42
supra.
202 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,901-02 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b)).
2 O0CC Mortgage Rule, supra note 169, at 18,944 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(a)).
204 FHLBB Final Rule, supra note 170, at 24,152 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(f)).
See text accompanying note 143 supra.
0 New Regulation Z, supra note 8, at 20,901 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1)).
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penalties. Clearly, failure to give any variable rate disclosure would
be a Truth in Lending violation subject to penalty, 2 07 but what if the
substituted disclosure is merely incomplete or inaccurate in some de-
tail? May the affected consumer recover the minimum civil penalties,
or may the appropriate supervisory agency seek reimbursement 2 0 for
understated annual percentage rates? The Board staff's commentary
indicates that transactions subject to variable rate disclosure rules of
other agencies are "exempt" from the Regulation Z variable rate
disclosures, but only if the creditor "has complied" with those other
rules. 209 A literal construction is that only information fully and
properly disclosed under other agency regulations is sufficient to re-
place the Regulation Z disclosures; anything less constitutes a TIL
violation.
In any case, prescinding from the mass of disclosure detail, how
much can be expected from disclosure about variable rate transac-
tions? Without giving each consumer a considerable volume of ex-
planatory materials and the aid of an experienced economic fore-
caster,2 10 it is impossible to believe that consumers will grasp more
than the rough outlines of the risks a variable loan entails. Even if
comparative information about the array of mortgage options in a
given market is broadly disseminated on a voluntary basis, consumers
will be hard-pressed to compare one lender's offering to another's.211
Possibilities for substantive abuse will continue: creditors may select
particularly favorable indexes, manipulate shared appreciation or
negative amortization features to steal the homeowner's equity, or
impose payment-schedule adjustments that entail real financial hard-
ship for consumers. Just as Professor Kripke could argue in 1969 that
Truth in Lending would not eradicate consumer fraud, so it can be
said today that variable rate disclosures cannot solve the problems or
avoid the dangers that lurk in variable rate lending in the 1980's. Most
certainly, variable rate disclosures will do nothing for the poor and
the almost-poor who are excluded from the housing market not by
- 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
2o8 The Simplification Act directs the federal supervisory agencies to require creditors to make
"adjustments" to consumer accounts for overcharges. Id. § 1607(e). The Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council's "policy guide" on enforcement of this (and other) "restitu-
tion" provisions reinforces this requirement. See 45 Fed. Reg. 48,712 (1980).
2 FRB Official Staff Commentary, supra note 42, at 50,329 (§ 226.18(1), comment 4).
210 See note 176 supra.
211 A recent Consumer Reports article on adjustable rate mortgages is well done and contains
several useful examples of how various mortgage forms work. See Housing Yourself, supra note
18. But the article takes up seven full pages, is not light reading, and of course does not describe
the specifics of any specific lender's particular options.
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variable rates, but simply by high rates. No matter how well wrought,
reforms like the Simplification Act cannot overcome the inherent
limits of disclosure in the face of the realities of the consumer credit
marketplace.
CONCLUSION
For better or worse, Truth in Lending has been simplified. Some
disclosure detail has been dropped, some critical terms redefined,
some troublesome court interpretations mooted. The Federal Reserve
Board's role as interpreter of Regulation Z has been solidified, but it
promises to do less interpretation. Openings may be created for imagi-
native early disclosure and for the expanded use of open-end plans.
Some of these reforms promise to extend the protection credit
disclosure can offer. Others, such as the requirement of segregating
disclosures in a federal box, already cry out for further reform. More
importantly, perhaps, changes in the credit marketplace-for exam-
ple, the rise of variable rate transactions-will generate new disclo-
sure problems and, also, further test the utility of disclosure as a tool
for facilitating credit shopping.
It should therefore not be surprising if, after a respectable period,
a movement to resimplify Truth in Lending gets seriously under-
way.212  One can only suggest that reform this time proceed on a
sounder empirical base and be tailored to a clear view of the purposes
of credit disclosure.2 13
212 The wait may not be very long. Senator Jake Cam (R.-Utah), present Chairman of the
Senate Banking Committee, has indicated his dissatisfaction with the Simplification Act and his
desire to "truly simplify truth in lending." 124 Cong. Rec. 13,152 (1978). True to his word,
Senator Garn has introduced a bill containing new Truth in Lending amendments. S. 1720, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 703-709, 127 Cong. Ree. S11,255, S1i,26S-69 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981).
Among other things, the proposed amendments would eliminate the -arrangef' concept from
the Act altogether, and would substantially expand the scope of the Act's preemption of state
disclosure laws. Id. §§ 703, 704, 127 Cong. Rec. at S11,168.
213 See note 4 supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
Nov.-Dec. 1981]
